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Using laboratory experiments within a New Keynesian macro framework, we
explore the formation of in￿ ation expectations and its interaction with monetary
policy design. The central question in this paper is how to design monetary policy in
the environment characterized by heterogeneous expectations. Rules that use actual
rather than forecasted in￿ ation produce lower in￿ ation variability and alleviate
expectational cycles. Degree of responsiveness to deviations of in￿ ation from its
target in the Taylor rule produces nonlinear e⁄ects on in￿ ation variability. We
also provide considerable support for the existence of heterogeneity of in￿ ation
expectations and show that a signi￿cant proportion of subjects are rational in our
experiment. However, most subjects rather than using a single model they tend to
switch between alternative models.
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11 Introduction
This paper discusses an experimental study on the interaction between expectations for-
mation process and monetary policy design within a macroeconomic framework. With
the development of explicit microfounded models expectations have become pivotal in the
modern macroeconomic theory. Moreover, the relationship between monetary policy and
expectations is crucial for promoting economic stability. Friedman￿ s proposals (1948 and
1960) for economic stability argue in favor of simple rules as they are easier to learn and
facilitate coordination of agents￿beliefs. Although, several leading macroeconomists and
policy makers, including the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bernanke (2007), stress
the importance of improving understanding of the relationship between economic poli-
cies (monetary policy), agents expectations, and equilibrium outcomes, macroeconomists
spent little e⁄ort on empirically elucidating these issues. Laboratory experiments provide
suitable environments to test these relationships as we can keep the underlying model
under control and expectation formation processes are observable. The advantage of our
experiment lies in the possibility to compare the aggregate dynamics of in￿ ation and
output gap and the e⁄ectiveness of monetary policy with the theoretical results. We
study this question by employing several simple instrumental monetary policy rules in
di⁄erent treatments and examine potential implications of the design of monetary pol-
icy for forecasting in￿ ation. Before we focus on the relationship between policy actions
and the formation of in￿ ation expectations, we establish some stylized facts about the
in￿ ation expectation formation. This paper provides substantial evidence in support of
heterogeneity in the forecasting process both across subjects and time.
The experiment is repeated under di⁄erent monetary policy regimes to assess how
alternative conducts of monetary policy in￿ uence the expectation formation process and
the degree of heterogeneity. The e⁄ectiveness of Taylor-type rules is then compared in
terms of variability of in￿ ation and in￿ ation forecasts. We explore how di⁄erent monetary
policy settings anchor in￿ ation expectations. We ￿nd that the variability of in￿ ation is
signi￿cantly a⁄ected by the degree of aggressiveness of monetary policy. Our results also
suggest that instrumental rules responding to contemporaneous in￿ ation perform better
than rules responding to in￿ ation expectations. Furthermore, the design of monetary
policy signi￿cantly a⁄ects the composition of forecasting rules used in the experiment
(heterogeneity) ￿especially the proportion of trend extrapolation rules ￿and thus the
stability of the main macroeconomic variables. The proportion of trend extrapolation
rules increases in an environment characterized by excessive in￿ ation variability and ex-
pectational cycles and then further ampli￿es the cycles. As already pointed out by
Marimon and Sunder (1995) the actual dynamics of an economy is a product of complex
interaction between underlying stability properties of the model and agents￿behavior.
Thus, it is imperative to design a monetary policy that is robust to di⁄erent expectation
2formation mechanisms.
Central banks increasingly attribute more importance to the developments of house-
holds￿in￿ ation expectations as they signal future in￿ ationary risks and provide useful
guidance how to anchor in￿ ation expectations. When analyzing individual responses
from students of the Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Tilburg University, we ￿nd that
subjects form expectations in accordance with di⁄erent theoretical models.1 Question
of rational expectations is carefully studied and found that for approximately one third
of subjects we cannot reject rationality. In the remaining sample the most popular rule
seems to be trend extrapolation. A signi￿cant share of population also uses adaptive
expectations, adaptive learning and sticky information type models.2 Adaptive learning
results are also novel as this paper represents one of the ￿rst estimations of the gain para-
meter. The average gain of agents that employ adaptive learning models is around 0:045.
Furthermore, when we allow switching between di⁄erent models, we ￿nd that adaptive
learning models are the most frequently used models for forecasting in￿ ation.
Rather than sticking to one model, switching between alternative models seems to
describe subjects￿behavior better. We observe that on average subjects switch every 4
periods. Therefore, this paper provides an empirical support for models that postulate
endogenous switching (e.g. Brock and Hommes, 1997). Furthermore, we also show that
agents use di⁄erent models as on average in each period 4:5 di⁄erent models are used in
groups of 9 subjects. This suggests that observed heterogeneity is pervasive.
A few experimental studies investigate the expectation formation process. Learning
to forecast experiments have been conducted before within a simple macroeconomic setup
(e.g. Williams, 1987; Marimon, Spear, and Sunder, 1993; Evans, Honkapohja, and Ma-
rimon, 2001; Arifovic and Sargent, 2003; Adam, 2007) and also within the asset pricing
framework (see Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and van de Velden, 2005 and Anufriev
and Hommes, 2011).3 These studies mainly focus on the aggregate expectations forma-
tion and tend to reject the rational expectations assumption in favor of adaptive way of
forming beliefs.4 Some analysis of the micro expectations data is conducted by Marimon
and Sunder (1995) and Bernasconi and Kirchkamp (2000) in an overlapping generations
1Several new theories of expectation formation, such as adaptive learning and information stickiness,
have not yet been subject to rigorous empirical tests. Empirical contributions so far mostly employed
aggregate data. We need to assure that agents￿current information sets encompass all the information
from the previous periods in order to assess these theories. Controlled laboratory environment avoids
these methodological issues that are present in the survey data.
2Adaptive learning assumes that subject are acting as econometricians when forecasting, i.e. reesti-
mating their model each time new data becomes available. See Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
3See Du⁄y (2008) and Hommes (2011) for a surveys on experimental macroeconomics.
4Arifovic and Sargent (2003) also ￿nd support of adaptiveness and some evidence of heterogeneity
of forecasts. Arifovic and Sargent (2003) focus on the time inconsistency problem, asserting that in
many cases policy makers achieve time-inconsistent optimal in￿ ation rate, although in some treatments
the economy moves towards sub-optimal (Nash) time consistent outcomes. Also Fehr and Tyran (2008)
suggest that expectations of individuals are heterogeneous. They study the adjustments of nominal prices
after the anticipated monetary shock.
3framework. These authors estimate several di⁄erent regressions in order to study in-
￿ ation expectation formation and ￿nd that most subjects behave adaptively, although
Bernasconi and Kirchkamp (2000) provide evidence that adaptive expectations are not of
￿rst order degree as argued in Marimon and Sunder (1995). So far, these two studies are
also the only exceptions that investigate the e⁄ects di⁄erent monetary policies to in￿ ation
volatility. Marimon and Sunder (1995) compare di⁄erent monetary rules in the overlap-
ping generations (OLG) framework to see their in￿ uence on the stability of in￿ ation
expectations. In particular, they focus on the comparison between Friedman￿ s k-percent
money rule and the de￿cit rule where the government is ￿xing the real de￿cit and ￿nance
it through the seigniorage. They ￿nd little evidence that Friedman￿ s rule could help to
coordinate agents beliefs and help to stabilize the economy. In￿ ation process might be
even more volatile in the case when Friedman rule is announced and maintained compared
to the economy where in￿ ation target is not announced, but the rational expectations
equilibrium is more stable under learning dynamics. Similar analysis is also performed
in Bernasconi and Kirchkamp (2000). They argue that Friedman￿ s money growth rule
produces less in￿ ation volatility, but higher average in￿ ation compared to constant real
de￿cit rule.5
Closer to our framework is the experiment by Adam (2007). He conducts experiments
in a sticky price environment where in￿ ation and output depend on expected in￿ ation and
analyzes the resulting cyclical patterns of in￿ ation around its steady state. These cycles
exhibit signi￿cant persistence and he argues that they closely resemble an restricted
perception equilibrium6 where subjects make forecasts with simple underparametrized
rules. In our experiment we also detect cyclical behavior of in￿ ation and output gap in
some treatments, however we show that these phenomena are not only associated with
underparametrization but also with heterogeneity of expectations, the design of monetary
policy and (its in￿ uence on) the degree of backward-looking behavior. Recently similar
setup to ours is used in Assenza, Heemeijer, Hommes, and Massaro (2011), where they
focus on the analysis of switching between di⁄erent rules.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model for experimental
analysis. Section 3 outlines the experimental design. In Section 4 we focus on the
analysis of individual responses while in Section 5 we analyze switching dynamics between
di⁄erent models. Section 6 studies the relationship between the monetary policy design
and expectation formation; Section 7 concludes.
5The e⁄ects of monetary policy design on expectations were also examined in Hazelett and Kernen
(2002) were they search for hyperin￿ ationary paths in the laboratory.
6Restricted perception equilibrium is generally more volatile than rational expectation equilibrium
(for more details see Evans and Honkapohja, 2001).
42 Model
In our experiment we use forward-looking sticky price New Keynesian (NK) monetary
model with di⁄erent monetary policy reaction functions. The advantage of the NK model
is that it is widely used in policy analysis and allows us to compare our experimental
results with those obtained theoretically. However, there are two implicit complications
for participants. First, it requires to forecast two periods ahead. It would de￿nitely be
easier for participants to produce one period ahead forecast (sometimes called "nowcast-
ing") as they would observe the realizations immediately after their forecasts are made.
This would also enable us to simplify the analysis of individual responses, especially in
the case of adaptive learning. The second complication is that the forward-looking NK
models assume that agents have to forecast both in￿ ation and output gap. We were
afraid that this would represent a too di¢ cult task for subjects. This is a considerably
more di¢ cult decision to make as we would depart from a standard macro model if we
would only ask participants to forecast in￿ ation. Nevertheless, we decided to do this ex-
periment only with expectations of in￿ ation as we were afraid that both issues mentioned
in this paragraph would make the task too di¢ cult for individuals. We leave the fully
forward-looking NK model for future work.
The baseline framework in the NK approach is a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model with money, nominal price rigidities, and rational expectations (RE). Lately
some authors have augmented this model for adaptive learning and also for heterogeneous
expectations (e.g. Branch and McGough, 2009). The model consists of a forward-looking
Phillips curve (PC), an IS curve, and a monetary policy reaction function.7
In this paper we decided to focus on the reduced form of the NK model, where we can
clearly elicit forecasts and study their relationship with monetary policy. Of course, there
is a trade-o⁄ between using the model from "￿rst principles" and employing a reduced
form. The former has the advantage of setting the objectives (payo⁄ function) exactly
in line with microfoundations, however forecasts are di¢ cult to elicit in this environment
where subject act as producers and consumers and interact on labor and ￿nal product
markets and do not explicitly provide their forecasts (for the latter approach, see Noussair,
Pfajfar, and Zsiros, 2011). Therefore, an appropriate framework, for the question that we
address in this paper, is the "learning to forecast" design where incentives are set in order
to induce as accurate forecasts as possible.8 In this framework, thus, we do not assign
subjects a particular role in the economy, rather they act as "professional" forecasters.9
The information set at the time of forecasting consists of macro variables at the time
7Detailed derivations are in, e.g., Woodford (1996), or textbooks such as Walsh (2003) or Woodford
(2003).
8The argument is similar to that in papers by Marimon and Sunder, where the same tradeo⁄was ￿rst
recognized.
9One way to think about the relation between "professional forecasters" and consumers/￿rms is that
these economic subjects employ professional forecasters to provide them with forecasts of in￿ ation.
5t ￿ 1, although the forecasts are made in period t for period t + 1. Mathematically we
denote this as Et￿t+1. Strictly speaking, it should be denoted as Et (￿t+1jIt￿1). In fact,
Et (forecast made at period t with information set t ￿ 1) might not be restricted to just
rational expectations.
The IS curve is speci￿ed as follows:
yt = ￿’(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + yt￿1 + gt; (1)
where interest rate is it, ￿t denotes in￿ ation, yt is output gap, and gt is an exogenous
shock. The parameter ’ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in demand. We can
observe that we do not have expectations of output gap in the speci￿cation. Instead, we
have lagged output gap.10 Compared to purely forward-looking speci￿cations, our model
might display more persistence in output gap. This is the most signi￿cant departure from
otherwise standard macroeconomic model.
Aggregating across the price setting decisions of individual ￿rms yields the linear
relationship in the equation (2). Thus, the supply side of the economy is summarized in
the following PC:
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿yt + ut: (2)
The longer prices are ￿xed on average, i.e. the smaller is ￿, the less sensitive in￿ ation
is to the current output gap. The parameter ￿ is the subjective discount rate. The shocks


























and e ut v N (0;￿2
u). In the NK literature it is standard to assume AR(1) shocks. gt could
justi￿ed as a government spending shock or a taste shock and standard interpretation of ut
is the technology shock. All these shocks are found to be quite persistent in the empirical
literature (see e.g. Cooley and Prescott, 1995 or Ireland, 2004). In the experimental
context it is important to have some exogenous unobservable component in the law of
motion for endogenous variables, so that we prevent the extreme case where all agents
coordinate on the forecasts identical to in￿ ation target. If we would not have AR(1)
shocks this would represent the dominant strategy. This is an especially relevant concern
as we initialize the model in the rational expectations equilibrium (REE).
10In principle, one could argue that this speci￿cation of IS equation corresponds to the case when
subjects have naive expectations on output gap or it is assumed the extreme case of habit persistence.
The main reason for including lagged output gap in our speci￿cation is that we want another endogenous
variable to in￿ uence the law of motion for in￿ ation. Furthermore, we prefer that even in the case when
agents have rational expectations they have to use the observed information on output gap for forecasting
in￿ ation as it enters into the perceived law of motion of the rational expectations form.
6To close the model, we have to specify the interest rate rule.11 We use two alter-
native Taylor-type rules in di⁄erent treatments. Most of our attention is devoted to
forward-looking reaction functions: in￿ ation forecast targeting where interest rate is set
in response to in￿ ation expectations. We study three parametrizations of this rule and
investigate how di⁄erent degrees of central bank￿ s aggressiveness in stabilizing in￿ ation
in￿ uence in￿ ation expectations. Next, we ask whether it is better for the central bank
to respond to the current or expected in￿ ation. Therefore, we also analyze the in￿ ation
targeting.
We start with the following interest rate rule (In￿ation Forecast Targeting):
it = ￿ (Et￿t+1 ￿ ￿) + ￿: (3)
In this version the central bank responds to deviations of in￿ ation from the target, ￿. We
vary ￿ in di⁄erent treatments and study stability of the system under alternative reaction
coe¢ cients attached to in￿ ation.
The second alternative speci￿cation is In￿ation Targeting, where the monetary author-
ity is assumed to respond to deviations of contemporaneous in￿ ation from the in￿ ation
target:
it = ￿ (￿t ￿ ￿) + ￿: (4)
We use McCallum and Nelson (2004) calibration. This calibration represents one
of the standard calibrations for the NK models. In order to have in￿ ation in positive
numbers for most of the periods we set the in￿ ation target to ￿ = 3. A summary of the
calibration is reported in the next table.
Insert Table 1 about here
Treatments are fully comparable as we have exactly the same shocks in all treatments.
In particular, ￿ and ￿ are calibrated to 0:6, while their standard deviations are 0:08:
11Engle-Warnick and Turdaliev (2010) and Noussair, Pfajfar, and Zsiros (2011) investigate the conduct
of monetary policy in an experimantal setting. Their subjects are only told to act as policymakers and
to stabilize in￿ ation. Most of the subjects control in￿ ation relatively well and authors argue that Taylor
rules provide a good description of subjects￿policy decisions.
73 Experiment
3.1 Design12
Experimental subjects participated in a simulated economy of 9 agents.13 Each session
of a treatment has 2 independent groups ("economies"), therefore 18 subjects participate
in each session. All participants were recruited through a recruitment programs for
undergraduate students at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra and University of Tilburg.
Invitations to apply were sent to all of around 1300 students in a database at Pompeu
Fabra (in May 2006) and to about 1200 students at Tilburg (in June 2009), except to
those that already participated in one of our sessions before. There are 70 periods in each
treatment. We scaled the length of each decision sequence and number of repetitions in
a way that each session lasts approximately 90 to 100 minutes, including the time for
reading the instructions and 5 trial periods at the beginning. The program is written in
Z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher, 2007).
Subjects are presented with a simple ￿ctitious economy setup. As it is shown above,
the economy is described with three macroeconomic variables: in￿ ation, output gap and
interest rate. Participants observe time series of these variables in a table, up to the
period t ￿ 1. 10 initial values (periods ￿9;:::;0) are generated by the computer under
the assumption of rational expectations. Subjects￿task is to provide in￿ ation forecasts
for the period t + 1. The underlying model of the economy is qualitatively described to
them. We explain the meaning of and the relationship between the main macroeconomic
variables and inform them that their decisions have an impact on the realized output,
in￿ ation and interest rate in time t. This is a predominant strategy in the learning to
forecast experiments (see Du⁄y, 2008, and Hommes, 2011).14
In every period t, there are two decision variables subjects have to input: i) prediction
of the t+1 period in￿ ation; ii) 95% con￿dence interval of their in￿ ation prediction. In 4
out of 6 independent groups in each treatment subjects have to report the interval as a
number of percentage points for which the actual in￿ ation can be higher or lower. In the
12Experimental instructions can be found in Appendix C.
13Most of the learning to forecast experiments are conducted with 5-6 subjects, e.g. Hommes, Sonne-
mans, Tuinstra, and van de Velden (2005), Adam (2007), Fehr and Tyran (2008).
14In learning to forecast experiments it is not possible to achieve REE (Rational Expectations Equilib-
rium) simply by introspection. This holds even if we provide subjects with the data generating process
as there exists uncertainty how other participants forecast, so subjects have to engage in a number of
trial and error exercises or in other words adaptive learning. It has been analytically proven in Marcet
and Sargent (1989) and further formalized in a series of papers by Evans and Honkapohja (see their
book: Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) that it is enough that agents observe all relevant variables in the
economy (as in our case, where they are speci￿cally instructed that all of them might be relevant) and
update their forecasts according to the adaptive learning algorithm (their errors) they will end up in the
REE. This has been acknowledged also in Du⁄y (2008) and Hommes (2011). Kelley and Friedman (2008)
provide a survey of experiments that support the theoretical result above. Examples of learning to fore-
cast experiments are e.g., Marimon and Sunder (1993, 1994), Adam (2007) and Hommes, Sonnemans,
Tuinstra, and van de Velden (2005).
8other 2 groups in each treatment, subjects are simply asked for the lower and the upper
bound of their in￿ ation prediction interval.
After each period subjects receive information about the realized in￿ ation in that
period, their prediction of it, and the payo⁄ they have gained. Subjects￿payo⁄s depend
on the accuracy of their predictions. The accuracy benchmark is the actual in￿ ation rate
computed from the underlying model on the basis of predictions made by all agents in the





k-subject￿point forecast of in￿ ation (K is total number of subjects in an economy). In
the subsequent rounds subjects are also informed about their past forecasts. They do not
observe the forecasts of other individuals and their performance. The payo⁄ function,
W, is a sum of two convex components as described below:

























The ￿rst, W1, depends on their forecast errors and is designed to encourage subjects
to give accurate predictions. It gives subjects a payo⁄ if their forecast errors, f, are
smaller than 4. The second, W2, depends on the width of their con￿dence interval and
intends to motivate subjects to think about the variance of actual in￿ ation since it is more
rewarding when it is narrower. CI is either equal to their point estimate of con￿dence
interval or half of the di⁄erence between the upper and the lower bound. They receive
a reward if their con￿dence intervals, CI, are not larger than ￿4 percentage points,
conditional on the fact that actual in￿ ation falls in the given interval: CI ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿t ￿ ￿k
t+1jt
￿ ￿ ￿.
With this setup we restrict to positive payo⁄s. Compared to more standard quadratic
payo⁄ functions, ours gives greater reward to more accurate predictions and incentivize
them to think also about small variations of in￿ ation, which may be important for their
payo⁄. As potentially this experiment can produce quite di⁄erent variations of in￿ ation
between di⁄erent sessions it is important to keep the incentive scheme quite steep. The
payo⁄ function is non-linear, thus, we accompanied it with generous explanation and a
payo⁄ matrix on a separate sheet of paper to make sure all participants understood the
incentives. Similar approach is used in Adam (2007).
Participants received detailed instructions before the experiment started. To ensure
understanding of the task, we read instructions out loud and present their task descrip-
tively along with examples. Subjects also ￿lled in a short questionnaire after they have
read the instructions and answered the questions about the procedures to make sure that
all participants understood them.
93.2 Treatments
The experiment consists of 5 sessions (a pilot session and 4 regular sessions). Participants
on average earn around e15 (￿$22), depending on treatment and individual performance.
Every experimental session represents a di⁄erent treatment, each using a di⁄erent speci-
￿cation of monetary policy reaction function.
Insert Table 2 about here
The ￿rst three treatments, as shown in the Table 2, deal with the parametrization
of the in￿ ation forecast targeting given in equation (3). In this setup, the coe¢ cient ￿
determines central bank￿aggressiveness to deviations of in￿ ation from its target. It is
also believed that the higher the ￿ is, the stronger is the stabilizing e⁄ect of the monetary
policy rule. It is of our key interest to see how subjects react to more and less aggressive
interest rate policies. Moreover, we test in a controlled environment whether di⁄erent
slope coe¢ cients indeed have the expected stabilization e⁄ect.
Majority of empirical ￿ndings agree that the magnitude of the slope coe¢ cient is
around 1:5. Generally, when ￿ > 1 the interest rate rule is E-stable and produces a
determinate outcome15 (Taylor principle) under rational expectations while the one with
￿ ￿ 1 is E-unstable and indeterminate. When Taylor principle holds all our treatments
yield determinate and E-stable REE. Initially, we planned to perform a treatment with
￿ < 1 to check whether this leads to instability, however ￿ndings from the pilot treatments
convinced us this is not a suitable choice as subjects quickly reached extremely high levels
of in￿ ation. This clearly leads to explosive behavior of the system, so our ￿ndings suggest
that also under heterogeneous expectations Taylor principle is required to produce an E-
stable and determinate outcome.16
For our ￿rst and benchmark treatment we decided to follow Taylor and chose ￿ = 1:5.
Average behavior of groups in the ￿rst treatment show no convergence to target in￿ ation,
so we choose ￿ = 1:35 as su¢ ciently di⁄erent case for a comparison. Alternatively, we
chose ￿ = 4 as parametrization with high stabilizing e⁄ect where convergence to the target
in￿ ation should be faster. We study determinacy and E-stability of these treatments in
Table 10.
In treatment 4 we focus on what measure of in￿ ation should central banks target:
the expected in￿ ation by subjects or actual in￿ ation. We perform a treatment using
15E-stability is asymptotic stability of an REE under least sqares learning. Under determinacy we
mean the existence of a unique dynamically stable REE. For more detailed de￿nition see Evans and
Honkapohja (2001). Proof that this is also the case in our setup can be foud in Table 10.
16Moreover, under these circumstances in￿ ation never returned to the target in￿ ation and just kept
growing. Therefore the e⁄ect of output gap on in￿ ation never outweights the expected in￿ ation e⁄ect.
Assenza, Heemeijer, Hommes, and Massaro (2011) perform a treatment where ￿ = 1: In their economy
with i.i.d. shocks this results in a convergence to values of in￿ ation that are di⁄erent than the target
value.
10in￿ ation targeting rule where central bank reacts to current in￿ ation, with ￿ = 1:5 as in
our benchmark case.
4 Analysis of Individual In￿ ation Forecasts
Before we move to the analysis of the interaction between monetary policy rules and
in￿ ation expectations, we have to ￿rst establish how subjects form in￿ ation expectations.
The analysis of individual responses focuses in the ￿rst part on learning dynamics. Several
learning models are simulated in order to ￿nd the best ￿t of each individual series on
expectations. We also estimate other standard models of expectation formation including
rationality tests. All these models are estimated for each individual using OLS. Reported
results are with robust standard errors that, where appropriate, take into account the
presence of clusters in groups (or treatments). Below we present each of these models and
tests. In the discussion we determine the best performing model for each subject, based
on the comparison of sum of squared errors (SSE) between competing models. In the
Section 5 we dig deeper and investigate potential switching of subjects between di⁄erent
models.
In 4 treatments of our experiment and 24 independent groups we gathered 15;120
point forecasts of in￿ ation from 216 subjects. The mean in￿ ation forecast for all treat-
ments is around 3:06% and the mean in￿ ation is 3:02% where the in￿ ation target is set to
3%. Standard deviations of in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations vary substantially across
groups. For in￿ ation expectations the largest is 6:31 and the lowest 0:23 while for in￿ a-
tion the largest is 5:83 and the smallest is 0:24. Standard deviations of in￿ ation forecasts
are usually higher than standard deviations of in￿ ation for groups with higher volatility
while for groups with lower volatility this might not necessary be the case. Figure A1 in
the Appendix A displays distribution of in￿ ation forecasts in each treatment.
Insert Table 3 about here
In Figure 117 it is possible to distinguish signs of rounding e⁄ect (or digit preference).
This is especially evident for the responses bellow 0 and above 6, however rounding is
also present for the responses between 0 and 6. Overall, we can point out that 72% of
all responses are reported to one decimal point accuracy, while 13% of them are to the
accuracy of 2 decimal points. The remaining 15% of forecasts are rounded as integers.
The overall share of the latter is signi￿cantly higher for the groups with higher volatility
compared to the groups displaying lower volatility.
Insert Figure 1 about here
17The full range of responses reported is between ￿13:9 and 24; however in this histogram we restrict
to responses between ￿3 and 10.
11However, we have to point out that survey data usually display more rounding, par-
ticularly the Michigan survey (see Curtin, 2005, Bryan and Palmqvist, 2005). Subjects in
experiments are paid according to their performance and thus the accuracy of forecasts
always matters. The mean of forecast errors in our experiment is 0:04 and the stan-
dard deviation is 1:23. Thus, there is only a slight positive bias of errors. Furthermore,
subjects overpredict in 51:2% cases and underpredict in 48:8%. Analysis on con￿dence
intervals can be found in our companion paper, Pfajfar and ￿ Zakelj (2011).
4.1 Models of Individuals Expectation Formation
We evaluate 10 models of expectation formation for each individual. Models are summa-
rized in the Table 4. For detailed discussion and brief description of the results of each
model see Appendix B.
model (eq.) speci￿cation
AR(1) process (M1) ￿k
t+1jt = ￿0 + ￿1￿k
tjt￿1 + "t
Sticky information type (M2) ￿k
t+1jt = ￿1￿0 + ￿1￿1yt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿k
tjt￿1 + "t

















Trend extrapolation (M5) ￿k
t+1jt ￿ ￿t￿1 = ￿0 + ￿1 (￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿2) + "t
General model (M6) ￿k
t+1jt = ￿ + ￿￿t￿1 + ￿yt￿1 + ￿it￿1 + ￿￿k
tjt￿1 + "t
Recursive - lagged in￿ ation (M7) ￿k
t+1jt = ￿0;t￿1 + ￿1;t￿1￿t￿1 + "t
Recursive - REE (M8) ￿k
t+1jt = ￿0;t￿1 + ￿1;t￿1yt￿1 + "t
Recursive - trend extrapolation (M9) ￿k
t+1jt ￿ ￿t￿1 = ￿0;t￿1 + ￿1;t￿1 (￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿2) + "t
Recursive - AR(1) process (M10) ￿k
t+1jt = ￿0;t￿1 + ￿1;t￿1￿k
tjt￿1 + "t
Table 4: Models of in￿ ation expectation formation. Note: ￿t is in￿ ation at time t; yt is
output gap, it is interest rate, and ￿k
t+1jt is kth subject￿ s in￿ ation expectations for time
t + 1 made at time t (with information set t ￿ 1).
Model (M1) is a simple AR(1), while model (M2) represents a weighted average regres-
sion similar in formulation to sticky information model by Carroll (2003a) and adaptive
expectations. In our framework we have forecasts derived under the assumption of ra-
tional expectations while Carroll (2003a) implements professional forecasters predictions.
This type of models are important for forecasting, especially in our framework where
some agents are backward-looking and also rational agents have to incorporate this into
their forecasts. Thus we estimate the model that is stated in terms of observable variables
with the restrictions on all coe¢ cients, where ￿0 and ￿1 are REE coe¢ cients.
In order to test for adaptive behavior, we apply di⁄erent learning rules to experimental
data. We ￿rst test learning on a model with constant gain updating (CGL) in model (M3),
where subjects revise their expectations according to the last observed error. # is the
constant gain parameter.
12We also check whether they learn with a decreasing gain parameter (DGL) in model
(M4). If the estimated parameter (￿ in this version) is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0, we
conclude that agents actually learn from their past mistakes with a decreasing gain over
time.
Next we evaluate simple trend extrapolation rules (M5). These are pointed out as
particularly important rules for expectation formation process in Hommes, Sonnemans,
Tuinstra, and van de Velden (2005). Simple learning rules do not capture all macroeco-
nomic factors that can a⁄ect in￿ ation forecasts. Therefore we estimate a more general
model of expectation formation described in model (M6).18
4.1.1 Recursive Representation of Simple Learning Rules
In this subsection as in the adaptive learning literature we assume that subjects behave
like econometricians, using all available information at the time of the forecast. In the
following speci￿cations, we test whether agents update their coe¢ cients with respect to
the last observed error. We use this estimation procedure for models (M7)-(M10). When
agents estimate their PLMs they exploit all available information up to period t ￿ 1. As
new data become available they update their estimates according to a stochastic gradient
learning (see Evans, Honkapohja, and Williams, 2010) with a constant gain. Let Xt and








. In this version of
constant gain learning (CGL) agents update coe¢ cients according to the following rule:




￿t ￿ Xt￿2b ￿t￿2
￿
: (5)
The empirical approach consists in searching the parameter # that minimizes the sum






(see Pfajfar and Santoro, 2010 for details).
The implicit problem in this approach is that we have to assume the initial values for b ￿t
for 2 periods. Setting up the initial values is one of the main problems when we recursively
estimate learning. This issue is extensively discussed in Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou
(2007). Strictly speaking, this problem should not occur in our case since we simply try
to replicate our time-series data as closely as possible. Thus, in the following recursive
learning estimations, we design an exercise in order to search for the best combinations
of the gain parameter and initial values to match each subjects￿expectations as closely
as possible. This strategy can also be considered as a testing procedure for the detection
of learning dynamics for each individual. If the gain is positive under this method of
initialization, then the series would exhibit learning for all other initialization methods
with higher (or equal) gain.
18Models in groups 19-24 do not have interest rate as dependent variable as this would imply multico-
linearity due to the design of monetary policy in our framework.
134.2 Comparison with "Classical Econometrician"
Before we discuss the best performing model for each individual we ask ourselves how
would a "classical" econometrician forecast in￿ ation in this environment.19 We estimate
a regression for each period in time using only the available information that is on the
subjects￿screens. Therefore, we estimate rolling regressions and make one-step-ahead
forecasts. Similar approach is used by Branch (2004) in the survey data literature for
proxying the rational expectations. He uses a trivariate VAR model and estimates it
recursively. In our case, because of degrees of freedom problems, we have to resort to
a univariate model (M6). For a comparison, we also recursively estimate the adaptive
expectations model (M3) and a version of trend extrapolation rule without the restrictions
on coe¢ cients. In practice, this rule is then equivalent to the AR(2) model. We evaluate
the general model (M6) with and without the restriction: ￿ = 0: Then we compare these
forecasts with the actual realizations and compute SSE, which are presented in the table
below for ￿ve competing models. Before starting the analysis it is worth pointing out
that in treatments where the variance of in￿ ation is higher also the mean SSE is higher
(correlation coe¢ cient is 0:91). In two thirds of our groups the trend extrapolation
rule is performing best. However, in more stable treatments the general model can also
outperform the trend extrapolation rule.
Insert Table 5 about here
This table gives us a benchmark for evaluating prediction accuracies of subjects.
It is interesting to note that best performing subjects often outperform our classical
econometrician (best performing model). This practically occurs in all groups except
the ones comprising treatment 3 where high frequency of cycles is observed (see Figure
2). There are two potential explanations for that: ￿rst, some subjects might be rational
or at least weakly rational and second, subjects might be switching between di⁄erent
expectation formation mechanisms. We start by investigating the ￿rst possibility while
in the next section we dig deeper regarding the second possible explanation.
4.3 Rational Expectations
Suppose that all subjects in the economy are rational, then their perceived law of motion
(PLM) is equal to the actual law of motion (ALM). There exists a unique evolutionary
19Of course, a more "sophisticated econometrician" could do a better job. For example, exogenous
shocks are not observable in our framework, but a better econometrician could design an unobserved
components model to extract information about the autoregressive shocks and then use them in these
regressions. In the RE paradigm shocks play a signi￿cant part in the formation of expectations. In some
treatments it is possible to observe that at least some agents extract information about the shock in the
PC and at least partly use this information when forecasting. This is especially evident in treatment 4.
















where B is matrix of coe¢ cient speci￿c to each treatment that is presented in the ￿rst
column of Table 10 below along with other properties of possible equilibria in this frame-
work. C is matrix of coe¢ cient values for exogenous variables. Note that ￿t￿1 does not
enter the REE solution. If we test this strict form of individual rationality we ￿nd that
we can reject it for all subjects.20
Several econometric tests are designed to check di⁄erent implications of the rationality
of forecasts, therefore most of them only assess weaker forms of rationality. Standard tests
commonly employed in the survey data literature21 focus on the most straightforward




t+1jt = ￿ + "t; (7)
By regressing expectational errors on a constant we check whether in￿ ation expectations
are centred around the right value. An additional test of rationality is presented in




t+1jt = a + (b ￿ 1)￿
k
t+1jt; (8)
where rationality implies jointly that a = 0 and b = 1. As in the test for bias, under the
null of rationality these regressions are meant to have no predictive power.
So far most of the experimental and empirical studies in economics have relied on
certain statistical properties to test for (weaker version of) rational expectations hypoth-
esis as de￿ned in (7) and (8). However, we believe that we can go one step further as
we are able to control subjects￿information sets and also more directly assess the RE
hypothesis.22 RE hypothesis postulates that rational agents use the correct distribution
in predicting the variables relevant for their decisions. Note that strictly speaking this
does not require the agents to know the model. Nevertheless, some discussion about the
form of the solution is warranted at this point. When all agents know the macroeconomic
model and behave accordingly, the form of RE solution is (6) and the actual coe¢ cient
values are presented in the ￿rst column of Table 10. However, as soon as one subject
departs from this behavior, other subjects must take this departure into account when
they make forecasts in order to be rational. Strictly speaking, they have to know his exact
20As it can be observed in the next subsection, this REE PLM model (M8) never outperforms other
models. Therefore, individual rationality (under the assumption of homogeneous expectations) can be
rejected for all our participants.
21See Pesaran (1987), and Bakhshi and Yates (1998) for a review of these methods.
22For a survey of experimental papers that assess the RE hypothesis see Kelley and Friedman (2008).
15PLM, so that they can implement this information into their PLMs. This is of course
very restrictive, and often impossible to expect as most of the experiments, including
ours, assume that the forecasts of others are not observable. By including interest rate
to their PLMs they can indirectly implement this information in treatments 1-3. Thus,
in the environment of heterogeneous forecasts the REE PLM (sometimes called "social"
rationality) may be of a di⁄erent form than the REE PLM in the case of homogeneous
rational forecasts (sometimes called individual rationality) as presented in (6).23 For ex-
ample, if some agents use the PLM with last observed in￿ ation, and the (socially) rational
agents are aware of that, then they have to include the last observed in￿ ation in their
PLMs as well.
As we can only estimate PLMs of individuals we have two di⁄erent possibilities to test
the social rationality, or more precisely RE in heterogeneous expectations environment: i)
to use the statistical de￿nition of rational expectations mentioned in (7) and (8), or ii) to
develop a new test for rationality based on comparing PLMs and the ALM. The intuition
behind the test comes from the minimal state variable procedures for calculating RE. We
pursue this by estimating the ALM for in￿ ation in each group and check whether the
estimated coe¢ cients of the corresponding PLM entail statistically di⁄erent coe¢ cients to
the ones of ALM. The appropriate ALM should be as general as possible. This approach
is also consistent with the adaptive learning view of forming expectations as it is implicitly
assumed in our experimental design. We assume that the ALM is of the following form,
which encompasses all the rules (forms of PLMs) that are discussed above:
￿t+1 = ￿0 + ￿1￿t￿1 + ￿2￿t￿2 + ￿3yt￿1 + ￿4it￿1 + "t; (9)
and the corresponding correctly parameterized PLM is:
￿
k
t+1jt = ￿0 + ￿1￿t￿1 + ￿2￿t￿2 + ￿3yt￿1 + ￿4it￿1 + "t: (10)
In order that we can claim that one subject has rational expectations the estimated
coe¢ cients in both regressions should not be statistically di⁄erent. To test for that we
estimate the following equation:
￿t+1 ￿ ￿
k
t+1jt = ￿0 + ￿1￿t￿1 + ￿2￿t￿2 + ￿3yt￿1 + ￿4it￿1 + "t; (11)
23In the words of Marimon and Sunder (1995): "A rational agent might not close his eyes to what he
actually sees happening"(p. 116). This issue has been discussed in the experimental ￿nance literature and
was labelled by Asparouhova, Bossaerts, Shin, and Cheng (2011) as the di⁄erence between individual
and social rationality. Nunes (2009) and MolnÆr (2007) have also discussed this in the theoretical
macroeconomic literature. Nunes (2009) studies this problem in the context of forward-looking NK
model and shows how to solve the model under the assumption of heterogeneous expectations. In
their theoretical frameworks they assume that the information sets of individuals include other subjects￿
forecasts.
16where ￿i = ￿i ￿￿i: For a subject to forecast rationally all estimated coe¢ cients (jointly)
in the equation (11) should not be statistically signi￿cant. In the discussion below we
compare these de￿nitions of RE. Rationality is in this case "superimposed" as we clas-
sify all agents that satisfy the requirements as rational irrespective of their expectation
formation mechanism.
4.4 Discussion
In this section we determine which theoretical model on average best describes the be-
havior of each individual. We compare the SSE24 of each individual for the 10 models
of expectation formation that are described above. A subject is regarded to use the
model which produces the lowest SSE between the model predictions and their actual
predictions.
We compare 9 models of in￿ ation expectation formation that best describe the be-
havior of at least 1 participant. Model (M4) is never used as it is always outperformed
by other models.
Insert Table 6 about here
In Table 6 we present 6 di⁄erent comparisons as we use di⁄erent de￿nitions of the RE.
In comparisons 1 and 2 we de￿ne the RE based on statistical properties as de￿ned in eq.
(8) while in comparisons 3 and 4 based on theory as it is outlined above in section 4.3
in eq. (11): in comparison 1 (3) at 5% signi￿cance level and in comparison 2 (4) at 1%
signi￿cance level. In comparison 6 we compare all empirical models, while in comparison
5 we exclude the general model from the set of alternative models.
We can observe that results are indeed quite similar across alternative de￿nitions of
RE, although the theoretical de￿nition (comparisons 3 and 4) suggests a slightly higher
proportion of rational subjects. One possible reason is that we estimate the model (11)
under the assumption of common AR(1) errors as the experiment design embeds unob-
served AR(1) shocks. Without this assumption comparisons 3 and 4 would imply 27:3%
and 31:0% of rational subjects. Generally, there is evidence that in all treatments about
30￿45% of subjects are rational and about 25￿35% of agents simply extrapolate trend.
Around 5￿10% of agents employ adaptive expectations while the remaining 15￿25% of
subjects mostly behave in accordance with new theories of expectation formation, adap-
tive learning and sticky information type models. As mentioned before, most of other
papers in the experimental literature stress the importance of adaptive expectations.25
24Results and conclusions are the same irrespectively whether we use RMSE (root mean square error),
R2 or SSE as they are all monotonic transformations of each other.
25For an illustration we report results from the empirical literature on heterogeneous expectation,
although these results might not be fully comparable to ours. Branch (2004) presents the results for 3
competing models of expectation formation (VAR, adaptive, and naive) estimated based on Michigan
17The estimation of recursive models (adaptive learning models) deserves a special at-
tention. For a comparison we consider comparison 1 in the Table 6. In this case, we
￿nd that the average gain of these subjects is 0:0447 with a standard deviation of 0:0537
(median is 0:0260). The standard deviation is quite high as there are a few very high
values, but most of the gains fall in the range between 0:01 and 0:07. There are only a
few estimates of the gain coe¢ cient in the literature. Orphanides and Williams (2005a)
suggest a gain between 0:01￿0:04 and Milani (2007) estimates it at 0:0183, while Pfajfar
and Santoro (2010) ￿nd smaller gains (around 0:00021 for a similar version of learning).
Results in this paper suggest slightly higher gains than most of the above papers, but
our data might be more volatile than the actual US in￿ ation.
The availability of information is probably the main reason why our results suggest
higher degree of rationality than some previous studies on the in￿ ation expectation. We
must bear in mind that subjects in our experiment have always available historical series
on all relevant macroeconomic variables and their past predictions. In the real world
all variables might not be readily observable or the information cost for collecting them
might play an important role. The other reason for high degree of rationality is that we
initialize the model under RE as explained in eq. (6). All these increase the possibility
of not rejecting the assumption of rationality.
We also study the degree of heterogeneity in each treatment separately. We present
comparison 1 across all treatments in Table A1 in Appendix A where we can observe that
there is quite a lot of heterogeneity across treatments. We further discuss this in the next
section, where we analyze switching between di⁄erent rules and assess the second possible
explanation why subjects might perform better than the "classical econometrician."
5 Switching Between Di⁄erent Models
The aim of this section is to further investigate how subjects form expectations. Do
they consistently use one model or do they switch between di⁄erent models? There
are some attempts in the literature to link the performance of forecasting rules to the
share of agents using that rule. Models that explore this issue are generally labeled
as rationally heterogeneous expectations models. Some examples of these models are
Brock and Hommes (1997), Branch and McGough (2008) and Pfajfar (2008). Their main
argument is that it is not always optimal from an utility maximization point of view to
forecast rationally as this might entail some costs.
In this section we tackle the problem from a slightly di⁄erent perspective as we only
survey data. He ￿nds that about 48% of agents use a VAR predictor and 44% of agents behave adaptively,
while the 7% are naive. Expectation formation of prices is also studied in the US beef market. Chavas
(2000) estimates that 81:7% of agents are boundedly rational using simple univariate models to forecasts
prices and 18:3% of agents are rational. Contrary to that, Baak (1999) ￿nds that the proportion of
rational agents is higher, i.e. about two thirds of agents are rational, while others are boundedly rational.
18have 9 subjects in each group. Their information sets are di⁄erent as subjects do not
directly observe past forecasts of other subjects. Thus it is not possible to compare
these di⁄erent models of dynamic predictor selection in our setup. We rather focus on
establishing some stylized facts about "unrestricted" switching on the individual basis.
An alternative approach, where all agents have the same information set is investigated
in Anufriev and Hommes (2008). They provide support for switching based on a version
of the predictor dynamics analyzed in Hommes, Huang, and Wang (2005) and show
that in an asset pricing environment the model with switching between simple heuristic
rules can replicate the main results of the Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and van de
Velden (2005) experiment in terms of individual behavior and aggregate dynamics. This
approach is followed also in Assenza, Heemeijer, Hommes, and Massaro (2011) where
the environment is more similar to ours. We proceed this analysis somehow di⁄erently
as our results above postulate that several of the employed rules are based on personal
information, i.e. they include their own past forecast (which is unobservable to others) to
their forecasting rule. In essence, we look at the roots of the switching behavior, where
we do not impose a particular switching mechanism.
5.1 Unrestricted Switching
We start this analysis by determining the optimal model for each individual in each
period with a recursive estimation of the models speci￿ed above. Our approach consists
of recursively computing the SSE up to a period t and then compares them in a period
t for each individual. This comparison is performed for all periods except for the ￿rst 4
periods. Therefore, we can determine which model best ￿ts the actual forecasting series in
each point in time and whether there is any switching observed among these models. As
many models￿predictions are very similar at least in some episodes, we assume that there
is no switching if the model that performs best in the previous period is not outperformed
in the current period by 0:1 percentage points in terms of forecasts accuracy or 0:01 in
terms of SSE. The rationale behind this choice is that the majority of forecasts are
reported to one decimal point accuracy and subjects are not able to di⁄erentiate between
these competing models. In Table 7 we report the relative shares of the usage of each
forecasting model considered along with descriptive statistics for in￿ ation.
Insert Table 7 about here
In Table 7 it can be seen that on average around 17% of cases subjects use the general
model, and in about 12% of all forecast decisions they behave in accordance with the sticky
information type model. The remaining third of all forecasts are best explained with some
sort of backward-looking models. In speci￿c, around 14% of cases subjects use simple
trend extrapolation rules while the remaining 20% of cases they behave in an adaptive
19manner. If we compare Table 7 with Table 6 we can observe that higher proportion
of all forecasts are made using one of the stochastic gradient learning algorithms when
allowing for switching. Depending on the treatment, in 23 to 45% of all cases agents
use these algorithms to forecast (as shown in Table 7). If we average this across groups,
36:7% of the forecast decisions are best explained with adaptive learning. This means
that, on average, adaptive learning is the most popular way of forming beliefs. Compared
to the results outlined above for the "average" best model, we can immediately observe
that there is approximately the same proportion of backward-looking cases as there are
subjects that use backward-looking rules. However, when allowing for switching there are
more forecast decisions made in an adaptive way. Also model (M10) is only a predominant
model for one subject, but when we allow for switching it is used on average in 15:6% of
all forecasts.
In Table 7 we can also observe that there are considerable di⁄erences among treat-
ments with respect to the average usage of forecasting models. While we postpone this
discussion to the next section, we can immediately observe that in more volatile treat-
ments (groups) there is a higher proportion of trend extrapolative models (M5) and a
lower proportion of sticky information type models (M2).
Generally, we can observe that when we allow subjects to switch between di⁄erent
models, they are in fact using alternative models to forecast. Under this assumption,
agents use between 1 and 7 di⁄erent models (average number of models used for forecast-
ing is 6:5) and they on average switch every 4 periods. However, switching is occurring
less frequently in treatments 3 and 4 compared to treatments 1 and 2 (signi￿cant at
5% level with di⁄erent tests of equality of medians).26 Only one subject did not switch
between models. Overall, these results support the idea of intrinsic heterogeneity that is
theoretically modelled in Branch and Evans (2006) and Pfajfar (2008).
To further analyze the degree of heterogeneity in the data, we compute the average
number of models used in each period across subjects. We ￿nd that on average 4:5 di⁄er-
ent models (between 2 and 7) are used within a group in each period. This additionally
supports the above conjecture that heterogeneity is pervasive as there are no signi￿cant
di⁄erences across treatments. The average number of models employed for forecasting
within a group varies (in each period) only between 4:2 and 5:3. Furthermore, there is
no "smoothing" employed across di⁄erent subjects in the same group. We have only
employed some "smoothing" within each subject as some models perform quite similarly
and cannot be di⁄erentiated at one decimal point accuracy.
We also investigate the pattern (timing) of switching with panel probit and logit mod-
els (with random, and ￿xed e⁄ects, and population averages), where dependant variable,
26With e.g. Kruskal-Wallis test. Switching is occuring on average every 6:1 periods in treatment 4,
3:7 periods in treatment 3, 2:6 period in treatment 2, and 2:9 periods in treatment 1.
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We ￿nd that subjects decide to switch according to the developments of in￿ ation, output
gap, and interest rate. Alternative models exhibit similar e⁄ects of the explanatory
variables. The most pronounced e⁄ect expectably comes from the output gap which has
a strong negative impact on the probability of switching. Positive change in in￿ ation
trend increases the probability of switching, however, higher in￿ ation decreases it. This
demonstrates that there exists a certain pattern in the structure of individual switching.
There are also some di⁄erences across treatments, especially in treatment 4 the pattern
of switching is di⁄erent. However, treatment dummies are insigni￿cant if we insert them
to the above regression. Results are reported in Table 8.27
Insert Table 8 about here
6 Monetary Policy in the Presence of Heterogeneous
Expectations
6.1 In￿ ation Variability and Monetary Policy
As we outlined in the introduction, a crucial question in the environment where expec-
tations are heterogeneous is whether policy prescriptions under a rational expectations
assumption remain intact in this environment. We start addressing this question by
showing that di⁄erent monetary policy rules produce di⁄erent variability of in￿ ation.
Woodford (2003) pointed out that within a standard NK model monetary policy should
minimize variance of in￿ ation and output gap as this corresponds to maximizing utility
of consumers. Therefore we start this section with the analysis of variance of in￿ ation as
the monetary authority cares only about in￿ ation in instrumental rules under scrutiny.
Tests for di⁄erences in medians across treatments where the null hypothesis that the
medians are the same in all treatments is rejected at 1% signi￿cance with Kruskal-Wallis
and van der Waerden tests (see Conover, 1999). Therefore, we can argue that the design
of monetary policy matters in our framework. The following table shows the pair-wise
comparison of median standard deviations of in￿ ation in treatments 2, 3, and 4 with the
baseline treatment 1. We report p-values of the Kruskal-Wallis test.28
27In this case it is not straightforward whether in the estimation procedure for the standard errors to
allow for intragroup correlation or intratreatment correlation. In the main text we report standard errors
that are clustered in groups and in the Table A2 in the Appendix A standard errors that are clustered
in treatments.
28Other nonparametric tests perform very similarly.
21Insert Table 9 about here
We can immediately observe that treatment 3 and 4 produce lower variation of in￿ a-
tion compared to treatment 1. In addition it is sensible to make the comparison between
treatments 2 and 3. We also ￿nd that there is a signi￿cant di⁄erence between these two
treatments (p-value is 0:0250). Thus, we can argue that treatments 3 and 4 produce
signi￿cantly lower in￿ ation variability than treatments 1 and 2. Now that we establish
that there is a di⁄erence in variance of in￿ ation between treatments, we further analyze
the roots of these di⁄erences between and within treatments. We graph the evolution of
in￿ ation across treatments in Figure 2.29
Insert Figure 2 about here
6.2 Expectations, Monetary Policy and Equilibrium Outcomes
There are several potential explanations for the di⁄erences outlined above and observed
cyclical behavior of in￿ ation: stability properties of di⁄erent models (monetary policy
rules) that we employ in the four treatments, the forecasting behavior of subjects and
the interaction between both features. We ￿rst establish the di⁄erences in properties
of (temporary) equilibria under di⁄erent expectation formation mechanisms and then
empirically assess the relationship between monetary policy and expectations.
Insert Table 10 about here
To have an illustration of how important are expectations for the stability of the
system we simulate our treatments with di⁄erent forecasting rules under the assumption
of homogeneous expectations (see Figures A4 and A5). We can immediately observe
that adaptive expectations (M3; with a gain coe¢ cient higher than 1) and trend ex-
trapolation rules (M5) can lead to pronounced cyclical variability of in￿ ation. It is also
possible to observe that treatments 2 and 4 perform better than 1 and 3 in stabilizing
those expectation formation mechanisms. However, the evidence is reversed with respect
to "stable" expectation formation mechanisms. To further understand the stability of
the system under di⁄erent expectation formation mechanisms in di⁄erent treatments we
analyze determinacy and E-stability (see Table 10) under several expectation formation
mechanisms that were empirically studied in the previous sections.30 There are several
29Detailed Figures with the evolution of in￿ ation and in￿ ation forecasts in each treatment are reported
in Appendix A (Figures A2 and A3).
30Where possible, we compute the equivalent of the MSV REE solution of the model under a particular
expectation formation mechanism. Where this is not possible (optimal coe¢ cients would be 0), we
approach this from the perspective of a temporary equilibrium, as in the case of naive expectations.
Similar approach would have to be used if we would calculate properties for sticky information type
model and adaptive expectation, however here it is not straightforward how to choose the parameter
values (and as one can see in Figures A4 and A5 the results will depend on these assumptions).
22potential theoretical reasons why we might observe excessive volatility: indeterminacy,
E-instability, underparametrization of the PLM, rules with non-optimal coe¢ cients, and
adaptive learning with constant gain. Let us point out that in order the system is locally
E-stable all the eigenvalues of the t-map associated with a particular solution (see Evans
and Honkapohja, 2001) have to be less than 1. We can observe that this is never the case
for the trend extrapolation rule (M5), naive expectations, and the general model (M6).
Furthermore, complex eigenvalues suggest that convergence is cyclical (and the higher
the eigenvalues are the higher the variability will be) as pointed out in Marimon and
Sunder (1995). Another source of instability could be indeterminacy. We see that this
arises when expectations are formed using trend extrapolation rules (except in treatment
3) and using the general model (M6). However if we look at the Figures A4 and A5, we
see that under trend extrapolation rule treatment 3 is potentially performing worst. On
the one hand, we con￿rm the results from Marimon and Sunder (1995) that stability of
the system provides a good explanation of the in￿ ation volatility, but only with respect
to the stable expectation formation mechanisms. On the other hand, for adaptive expec-
tations (M3) and trend extrapolation rules (M5) the link between the underlying stability
of the model and in￿ ation variability might well be reversed. This will be detailed in the
following subsections. Generally, we can conclude that the stability and determinacy of
the system crucially depend on the expectation formation mechanism. The system that
is E-stable and determinate under RE might not be under di⁄erent expectation formation
mechanisms.
6.3 In￿ ation Variability and Expectations
One could argue that potentially there are di⁄erences across treatments in both the
proportion of subjects using a particular forecasting rule and also in parameter estimates
associated with a particular rule. We ￿rst brie￿ y assess the latter while majority of this
section will then be devoted to the former explanation.
As we saw above, parameter estimates of certain rules, especially trend extrapolation
and adaptive expectations, can produce very di⁄erent equilibrium dynamics. First, it
would be interesting to see whether the average coe¢ cient of trend extrapolation rule
(￿1) in M5 is higher in more volatile treatments. Indeed, it is the highest in treatment 1
(0:53) and the lowest in treatments 3 (0:38). Also sticky information type models (M2)
exhibit signi￿cant di⁄erences across treatments. Groups in treatment 3 had the highest
average ￿1 (0:37), while those in treatment 2 had the lowest (0:11). Therefore in treat-
ment 3 these expectation rules produce a more stabilizing e⁄ect than in treatment 2.
Similar evidence to that for trend extrapolation rules is also found for adaptive expec-
tations (M3) models. These rules with a gain coe¢ cient larger than 1 represent another
threat for stability. Here we can conclude that these di⁄erences are important (and some-
23times statistically signi￿cant), however the proportion of agents using a particular rule is
potentially even more important to explain the observed results. The second issue that is
worth to investigate is the relationship between the gain parameter in adaptive learning
PLMs and the stability of the system as in e.g. Marcet and Nicolini (2003). The theory
suggests that constant gain learning produces higher variability of the underlying series
compared to decreasing gain learning. Furthermore, the variability increases in the level
of the (constant) gain parameter. Therefore, one could expect that average gains would
be higher in more volatile treatments. When empirically assessing this conjecture, we
￿nd evidence of higher average (and median) gains for more stable treatments (3 and 4)
compared to more volatile treatments (1 and 2). Therefore we could not ￿nd support
for this conjecture. This is most likely because adaptive learning becomes more impor-
tant when "￿ne tuning" expectations. When the underlying series becomes too volatile
subjects tend to switch to backward looking expectations, especially trend extrapolation
rules. We can conclude that constant gain learning does not represent an important
source of the di⁄erence between volatilities in di⁄erent treatments.
As it was mentioned before, the proportion of especially trend extrapolation subjects
plays a particularly important role for the stability of the system. We can observe that
there is a considerable degree of heterogeneity across treatments (see Table A1). Even
more, results from Table 7 suggest that di⁄erences in the proportion of trend extrap-
olation subjects can explain the di⁄erences in variability between groups in the same
treatment. The results are intuitive as we ￿nd that there is a strong correlation between
the variability of in￿ ation and the degree of trend extrapolation behavior. We further test
these conjectures regarding the relationship between the variability and the proportion of
di⁄erent groups of subjects with cross-sectional and panel data regressions. With former,
while estimating the below regression, we ￿nd that especially the increasing proportion of
trend extrapolation behavior is increasing the variance. Also the increasing proportion of
CGL adaptive expectations rules is increasing the variance as most of the estimated co-
e¢ cients # in equation (M3) are higher than 1 while the proportion of recursive learning
(M10) and also sticky information rules (M2) is reducing it. We estimate the following
regressions:
sds = ￿0 + ￿1pjs + "s; (13)
where sds is a standard deviation of in￿ ation in group s; and pjs is the proportion of agents
using j-th model for forecasting in group s. The set of alternative models is the same as in
Table 6 above. Regression results are reported in Table 11, both with robust and clustered
standard errors. Initially, we added treatment dummies to the above regression; however
they were insigni￿cant in almost all cases.31 We have to point out that all estimated
coe¢ cients (that are signi￿cantly di⁄erent than 0) have the expected signs.
31Thus we decided to report them only for the regression (14). See Table A2.
24Insert Table 11 about here
These results are con￿rmed also with the system GMM estimator of Blundell and
Bond (1998) for dynamic panels. To construct the panel we compute the sds;t, standard
deviation from the ￿rst period up to period t: Using the switching analysis we similarly
compute pjs;t; the share of model j in group s up to the period t: We estimate the following
model:
sds;t = ￿0 + ￿Lsds;t￿1 +
X
j
￿jpjs;t + "st: (14)
Results are reported in Table 12. Coe¢ cient on the proportion of the general model (M6)
gives inconclusive results in the above regressions. Therefore it is di¢ cult to say from
this analysis what is the e⁄ect of the "popularity" of general model (M6) to the stability
of in￿ ation. Although these agents use all relevant information to forecast in￿ ation sim-
ulation exercise shows that at low values of ￿ this forecasting model (if used exclusively)
will result in a high variability of in￿ ation (see Figure A6), which con￿rms the analysis
in Table 10. Furthermore, as explained above, if one uses the general model (M6) for
forecasting the model exhibits indeterminacy, i.e. there might be a multiple equilibria
problem.
Insert Table 12 about here
Results in Tables 11 and 12 show that the proportion of subjects that use trend
extrapolation rules exert a strong e⁄ect to the standard deviation of in￿ ation, thus robust
to di⁄erent techniques used in these tables. The proportion of these agents probably
plays the most important role for the stability of in￿ ation. It also helps us to explain
the di⁄erences among groups within the same treatment. Generally, we note that the
group with lower proportion of trend extrapolation rules is more stable compared to
other groups in the same treatment. To further study treatment e⁄ects we add treatment
dummies to the speci￿cation in eq. (14). Result are reported in Table A2 in Appendix,
where we can observe that treatment 4 (in￿ ation targeting) produces additional e⁄ects to
those explained above, which lead to signi￿cantly lower variability of in￿ ation compared
to treatment 1.
6.4 Discussion
The relationship between the underlying model and the expectation formation has been
recently studied in Heemeijer, Hommes, Sonnemans, and Tuinstra (2009). They com-
pare experimental results in positive and negative expectations feedback models.32 In a
positive expectations system, e.g. asset pricing model, they observe a similar aggregate
32Also Fehr and Tyran (2008) compare the two environments, although in a di⁄erent context.
25behavior to ours and note that when there is a stronger positive feedback more agents
resort to backward-looking, especially trend following rules. In our case, by changing the
monetary policy, we augment the degree of positive feedback from in￿ ation expectations
to current in￿ ation. Therefore, the design of monetary policy is important for the pre-
vailing expectation formation mechanism and vice versa, as can be seen if we compare
results within the same treatment.
However, this is only a part of the story in our experiment. We expected that the
treatment 2 where monetary authority does not react too strongly to in￿ ation expecta-
tions (￿ = 1:35) performs better regarding the stability of in￿ ation than the benchmark
treatment, although the theory under rational expectations suggests that higher ￿ leads
to lower variability of in￿ ation. This is not con￿rmed in our analysis above as the median
standard deviation is not statistically di⁄erent than in treatment 1. This might be due
to expectations of cycles by some individuals in groups 4 and 5 of this treatment and
extensive use of strong trend extrapolation rules at the beginning of the experiment. In
order to study the relationship between ￿ and the variance of in￿ ation under di⁄erent
expectation formation mechanisms we design simulation exercises that exactly replicate
the design, parameterization and shocks employed in the experiment, we only vary ￿ and
study the variability of in￿ ation (see Figure A6). On the one hand, when all subjects
have rational expectations we con￿rm the theory that higher ￿ leads to lower variability
of in￿ ation; similar evidence holds for other expectation formation mechanisms that we
labelled above as stable, although the decreasing variability might sometimes be non-
monotonic. On the other hand, several expectation formation mechanisms produce a
U-shaped behavior of the in￿ ation variance. Especially trend extrapolation rules will
lead to the U-shaped behavior and eventually higher variability when increasing ￿. The
minimum variability of in￿ ation with sticky information and trend extrapolation rule is
achieved at ￿ = 1:1 (see Figure A6). For naive expectations the minimum is around
￿ = 3 (non-monotonic U-shaped). This can be also observed from Figures A4 and A5.
As already mentioned in section 6.2, more stable models under REE have the potential
to produce more volatile in￿ ation when unstable expectation formation mechanisms pre-
vail. Therefore, the relationship between the variability of in￿ ation and di⁄erent rules is
nontrivial and the question whether treatment 2 should produce lower variability com-
pared to treatment 1 depends particularly on the proportions of alternative rules used.
Based on simulation results and observed behavior of individuals we can argue that in
the presence of heterogeneous expectations instrumental rules that are less aggressive
have the potential to produce lower variability of in￿ ation, however there is the risk that,
e.g. after a shock, the amplitude of in￿ ation increases signi￿cantly as monetary policy
is not aggressive enough. Thus, one could argue that non-linear Taylor-type rules would
perform best in this environment, although the literature in monetary economics has not
devoted much attention to this type of instrumental rules.
26As we have seen so far, the expectational feedback is not the only source of instability
in our underlying model.33 Treatment 3 produces lower variability of in￿ ation compared
to treatment 2, but in the former case the frequency of cycles is signi￿cantly higher as
the monetary authority is (too) strongly responding to deviations from in￿ ation target.
After some threshold of response to in￿ ation forecast (depends on the proportion of
agents using each rule) the resulting amplitude of the in￿ ation variability decreases,
while the frequency of cycles increases. The latter makes it more di¢ cult to forecast and
more participants resort to simpler underparametrized rules. Using simulations explained
above we can identify two e⁄ects of increasing ￿ on the variability of in￿ ation: i) it always
increases the frequency of cycles irrespective of the expectation formation mechanism and
ii) it increases or decreases the amplitude of the cycle depending on the level of ￿ and
the expectation formation mechanism. It can produce non-monotonic or even U-shaped
responses of variability, except for rational expectations where it decreases monotonically
(see Figure A6).
Also treatment 4 produces lower variance of in￿ ation than the benchmark treatment
as it can be observed in Table 9. Responding to contemporaneous in￿ ation (as in treat-
ment 4) turns out to be a better practice for a central bank in our experiment compared to
responding to in￿ ation expectations,34 although the stability properties of the two models
under di⁄erent expectation formation mechanisms (see Table 10) are quite similar (and
treatment 1 might be even in a slight advantage). Moreover, this treatment resembles
quite closely the behavior of survey forecasts, as there are periods when subjects system-
atically overpredict in￿ ation (low and stable in￿ ation) and underpredict in￿ ation (when
in￿ ation is high). This is evident in Figure A3 in the appendix A. In this treatment
there is the highest proportion of biased agents and also results from the general model
suggest similar behavior of these agents to the results obtained in the survey data litera-
ture. Moreover, if we compare the means of in￿ ation forecasts in treatments 1 and 4 we
￿nd that the mean of in￿ ation forecasts of groups in treatment 4 is signi￿cantly higher
than the mean of in￿ ation forecasts of groups in treatment 1 (at 10% signi￿cance with
Kruskal-Wallis test). Also average in￿ ation in treatment 4 is higher (3.10 in treatment 4
compared to 3.00 in treatment 1), however the di⁄erence is statistically insigni￿cant with
nonparametric tests. Comparison between treatments 1 and 4 implies that signi￿cantly
lower standard deviation of in￿ ation (and in￿ ation forecasts) for treatment 4 (see Table
9) comes at a "cost" of higher in￿ ation expectations (and possibly in￿ ation). This result
is similar to Bernasconi and Kirchkamp (2000) as they suggest Friedman￿ s money growth
rule produces less in￿ ation volatility, but higher average in￿ ation compared to constant
33Generally, as ￿ is increasing the positive feedback is decreasing. If we compare treatments 1 and 4,
we ￿nd that expectational feedback is lower in treatment 4.
34Pfajfar and Santoro (2008) and Muto (2008) reach similar conclusion in di⁄erent versions of the NK
model: Muto (2008) in case when agents learn from central banks￿forecasts, while Pfajfar and Santoro
(2008) when they introduce the cost channel and capital market imperfections.
27real de￿cit rule. We can also observe that the variability of in￿ ation is generally lower
than the variability of in￿ ation expectations. Intuitively, this provides an explanation to
the result that responding to current in￿ ation stabilizes the system in a more e¢ cient way
compared to reacting to expected in￿ ation. In booms monetary policy overreacts less in
treatment 4 than in the case when interest rate is set to respond to expected in￿ ation
(in presence of trend extrapolating subjects). At the root of this pattern is that trend
extrapolating subjects do not observe the informational content of output gap and do not
predict the change in the growth rate of in￿ ation when approaching the top of the boom.
They still expect that in￿ ation will accelerate as in the last few periods. Then, if the
monetary authority is reacting with respect to the expected in￿ ation, they do not change
the stance of monetary policy in time. The economy is pushed in the recession where the
backward-looking agents underpredict in￿ ation and the recession is more severe than if
all agents were rational. The whole process repeats in the next cycle. Again, we have to
point out that the causality goes in both directions as the proportion of trend extrapo-
lating subjects depends on the design of monetary policy (degree of aggressiveness) and
also the stability of the economy is in￿ uenced by the proportion of subjects using these
rules.
Adam (2007) obtains a similar dynamic pattern of in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations,
especially to our treatment 3. He argues that the cause for observed behavior is the
subjects￿reliance to simpler underparametrized rules for forecasting in￿ ation. Thus, he
characterizes the dynamics of in￿ ation as a restricted perception equilibrium, as in￿ ation
exhibits excessive volatility around its REE. Our paper supports his ￿ndings as some
agents do not take into account output gap when forecasting. However, we also show that
the volatility of in￿ ation depends on the way monetary policy is designed and conducted.
We argue that the proportion of backward-looking subjects plays an important role,
especially those that use trend extrapolation rules.35
7 Conclusion
In this paper we present results from a macroeconomic experiment where subjects are
asked to forecast in￿ ation. The underlying model of the economy is a simpli￿ed version of
the standard New Keynesian model that is commonly used for the analysis of monetary
policy. The focus is on the formation of in￿ ation expectations and monetary policy design.
In di⁄erent treatments we employ various modi￿cations of Taylor-type instrumental rules.
We study the potential e⁄ectiveness of alternative monetary policy designs in a framework
35Also several asset pricing experiments have observed the dynamics of aggregate price exhibiting
bubbles (see eg. Smith, Suchanek, and Williams, 1988 and Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and van de
Velden, 2005). Even more, Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001) show that this can occur also in an environment
where speculation is not possible. They conclude that this occurs due to systematic errors in decisions.
28characterized by heterogeneous expectations. In all our treatments we observe cyclical
behavior of in￿ ation and output gap around their steady states. We ￿nd that some
monetary policy designs more e⁄ectively stabilize and anchor the process of in￿ ation
expectations and thus result in lower in￿ ation variability. However, these prescriptions
are quite di⁄erent to those derived under homogeneous rational agents. We ￿nd that
the variability of in￿ ation is signi￿cantly lower in the in￿ ation targeting treatment and
in the in￿ ation forecasting treatment with a strong reaction to deviations of in￿ ation
forecasts from in￿ ation target compared to other in￿ ation forecasting treatments with
weaker reactions. When we employ current in￿ ation in the monetary policy rule, we
observe that this dynamics of in￿ ation expectations most closely resembles the behavior
of survey data. This setup results in lower in￿ ation variability than the setup where
expected in￿ ation is used in the policy rule. There are several reasons for that: ￿rst, the
expectational feedback of the former model is lower compared to the latter one; second,
lower observed variability of in￿ ation compared to in￿ ation expectations in conjunction
with the ￿rst reason further decreases the resulting variability of in￿ ation and output
gap. Thus, we reduce the amplitude of expectational cycles. However, in this interplay
between in￿ ation variability, monetary policy, and in￿ ation expectations the causality
does not go only in one direction. We can also point out that the underlying process of
in￿ ation expectation formation depends on the way monetary policy is conducted. The
proportion of backward-looking agents, especially trend extrapolating subjects, plays a
crucial role for the stability of the system. In some environments it is more di¢ cult
to forecast rationally and thus more subjects resort to simpler backward-looking rules.
Thus, we show that monetary policy also in￿ uences the expectation formation process.
Our results suggest that there is a signi￿cant and relatively large share of agents who
behave consistently with the assumptions of rationality. The remaining agents use some
version of adaptive expectations, adaptive learning or trend extrapolation rules. Most
importantly, we ￿nd that expectations are heterogeneous both across subjects and across
time for individual subjects. Most subjects, in fact, tend to switch between di⁄erent
rules. When we take into account this possibility, adaptive learning models become more
important as this mechanism for forecasting is used in more than 1/3 of all forecasting
decisions. This paper is one of the ￿rst empirical contributions to postulate that these
models represent one of the most popular ways of forecasting in￿ ation. Furthermore, as
pointed above, both the proportions of subjects using a particular rule and the estimated
coe¢ cients in this rule are dependent on the monetary policy.
Our economy is represented by a simpli￿ed version of a commonly used model in
macroeconomics, where a model is already a simpli￿cation of the reality so we have to
take this into account when making policy prescriptions. Nevertheless, from our analysis
it comes clear that the policy-makers should ask themselves what they can do to help
consumers to anchor their expectations (or learn to form more accurate forecasts) and
29design monetary policy accordingly. This is a relevant policy question that triggered quite
some attention in the literature. However it is crucial to understand the interplay be-
tween monetary policy and expectations in order give answer to the above question as it
is already argued in Friedman (1948 and 1960) and recently recognized also by Bernanke
(2007). Our paper attempts to shed light to the understanding of this relationship that
has been to a large extent unexplored in the literature so far. We argue that rules that
respond to observed in￿ ation are less likely to trigger expectational cycles and "push"
agents into forming expectations in a backward-looking fashion, especially into trend ex-
trapolation mechanism, which even further stretches the expectational cycles. We also
demonstrate that the slope coe¢ cient in the Taylor rule that reacts to deviations of in￿ a-
tion from its target plays a crucial role in the heterogeneous expectations environment.
In some cases it might even be bene￿cial that the policy makers do not react too strongly
to deviations of in￿ ations, although the Taylor principle should always be satis￿ed.
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￿ = 0:99 ￿ = 3 ￿ = 0:6
’ = 0:164 ￿ = 0:3 ￿ = 0:6
Table 1: McCallum-Nelson Calibration
Treatment Groups Taylor rule (equation) Parameters
In￿ ation forecast targeting (1) 1-6 Forward looking (3) ￿ = 1:5
In￿ ation forecast targeting (2) 7-12 Forward looking (3) ￿ = 1:35
In￿ ation forecast targeting (3) 13-18 Forward looking (3) ￿ = 4
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Figure 1: Histogram of in￿ ation forecasts for all treatments.
3637Comparison
model (eq.) 1 2 3 4 5 6
Rational expectations: Stat (8) 28.7 42.1 - - - -
Rational expectations: Theory (11) - - 40.7 44.9 - -
AR(1) process (M1) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Sticky information type (M2) 6.5 5.6 4.2 3.2 10.2 6.5
Adaptive expectations (M3) 7.4 5.1 4.2 4.2 11.6 9.3
Trend extrapolation (M5) 30.1 25.5 28.2 26.9 36.6 26.9
Recursive - lagged in￿ ation (M7) 11.6 7.9 8.8 8.3 21.8 9.3
Recursive - REE (M8) 2.8 2.3 2.8 1.9 4.2 1.4
Recursive - AR(1) process (M10) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Recursive - trend extrapolation (M9) 12.0 10.6 10.2 9.7 14.8 12.0
General model (M6), ￿ = 0 - - - - - 34.3
Table 6: In￿ ation expectation formation (percent of subjects)
3839Probit RE Probit PA Logit RE Logit PA Logit FE
Cons. -0.2502*** -0.2210*** -0.4139*** -0.3552***
(0.0836) (0.0749) (0.1449) (0.1188)
j￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿2j 0.0422 0.0402 0.0661 0.0639* 0.0545
(0.0293) (0.0247) (0.0482) (0.0388) (0.0354)
￿t￿1 -0.0568*** -0.0533*** -0.0919*** -0.0857*** -0.076**
(0.0219) (0.0190) (0.0345) (0.0302) (0.0383)
yt￿1 -0.1702*** -0.1596*** -0.2747*** -0.2577*** -0.2540***
(0.0391) (0.0381) (0.0674) (0.0623) (0.0591)
it￿1 0.0440** 0.0415** 0.0715** 0.0670*** 0.0575**




0.0061 0.006 0.011 0.0099 0.0089
(0.0171) (0.0143) (0.0248) (0.0260) (0.0359)
ln(￿
2) (panel) -1.5874*** -0.5814***
(0.1996) (0.2064)
￿ (panel) 0.4522*** 0.7478***
(0.0441) (0.0783)
￿ (panel) 0.1670*** 0.1453***
(0.0270) (0.0256)
N 14040 14040 14040 14040 13975
Groups 216 216 216 216 215
Obs per Group 65 65 65 65 65
Wald ￿2(9) 34.0 31.8 31.2 32.6 36.2
Table 8: Determinants of switching behavior. Notes: RE stands for random e⁄ects, PA
population averages, while FE is for ￿xed e⁄ects model. Standard errors in parentheses.
*/**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1 percent level. Standard errors are calculated
using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account potential presence
of clusters in groups.
Treatment Groups Comparison with Treatment 1 (p-value)
In￿ ation forc. targ. ￿ = 1:5 1 ￿ 6 ￿
In￿ ation forc. targ. ￿ = 1:35 7 ￿ 12 0:6310
In￿ ation forc. targ. ￿ = 4 13 ￿ 18 0:0104
In￿ ation targeting ￿ = 1:5 19 ￿ 24 0:0250









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4142reg1 reg2 reg3 reg4
sds;t 1.0147*** 1.0121*** 1.0121*** 1.0099***
(0.0085) (0.0073) (0.0069) (0.0066)
Gen. mod. (M6), ￿ = 0 0.0018*** 0.001 0.0031*
(0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0017)
Sticky info. (M2) -0.0029* -0.0039 -0.0018 -0.0043**
(0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0020)
ADE DGL (M4) -0.0023** -0.0030** -0.0008 -0.0027**
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0014)
Trend Ext. (M5) 0.0067*** 0.0055*** 0.0077*** 0.0055***
(0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0014)
ADE CGL (M3) -0.0011 0.001
(0.0018) (0.0015)
Recursive V1 (M7) -0.0021 -0.0025
(0.0025) (0.0018)
Recursive V4 (M9) 0.0021
(0.0025)
cons -0.0759* 0.0219 -0.1895 0.0373
(0.0417) (0.1378) (0.1449) (0.0556)
N 1560 1560 1560 1560
￿2 67328.4 54449.2 65883.1 79094.9
Table 12: Decision model￿ s in￿ uence on standard deviation of in￿ ation. Notes: Esti-
mations are conducted using system GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) for
dynamic panels. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1
percent level. Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replica-
























0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3















Figure 2: Group comparison of expected in￿ ation (average subject prediction) and
realized in￿ ation by treatment. Treatment 1 has in￿ ation forecast targeting (IFT) with
￿ = 1:5. Treatment 2 has IFT with ￿ = 1:35. Treatment 3 has IFT with ￿ = 4.
Treatment 4 has in￿ ation targeting with ￿ = 1:5.







































-2 0 2 4 6 8 -2 0 2 4 6 8
-2 0 2 4 6 8 -2 0 2 4 6 8
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Treatment 3 Treatment 4
All groups Group 1 Group 2 Group 3









Figure A1: Histogram of individual in￿ ation forecasts for the six independent groups in
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Sticky information (8) General model (18)
Trend extrapolation (10) Adaptive expectations (11)
Figure A6: Variability of in￿ ation and alternative expectation formation rules (in￿ ation
forecast targeting).
model (eq.)n Treatments 1 2 3 4 All
Rational expectations (8) 35.2 48.1 5.6 25.9 28.7
AR(1) process (M1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.5
Sticky information type (M2) 3.7 1.9 16.7 3.7 6.5
Adaptive expectations (M3) 9.3 3.7 7.4 9.3 7.4
Trend extrapolation (M5) 35.2 25.9 25.9 33.3 30.1
Recursive - lagged in￿ ation (M7) 3.7 5.6 24.1 13.0 11.6
Recursive - REE (M8) 0.0 1.9 9.3 0.0 2.8
Recursive - trend extrapolation (M9) 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.5
Recursive - AR(1) process (M10) 13.0 13.0 11.1 11.1 12.0
Table A1: In￿ ation expectation formation across treatments (percent of subjects, Com-
parison 1)
50Probit RE Probit PA Logit RE Logit PA Logit FE
Cons. -0.2502 -0.221 -0.4139 -0.3552*
(0.3537) (0.1884) (0.3149) (0.1817)
j￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿2j 0.0422 0.0402 0.0661 0.0639 0.0545
(0.0376) (0.0317) (0.0600) (0.0559) (0.0632)
￿t￿1 -0.0568 -0.0533 -0.0919 -0.0857 -0.076
(0.3717) (0.1945) (0.3099) (0.1611) (0.2747)
yt￿1 -0.1702*** -0.1596*** -0.2747*** -0.2577*** -0.2540***
(0.0518) (0.0471) (0.0808) (0.0769) (0.0925)
it￿1 0.044 0.0415 0.0715 0.067 0.0575




0.0061 0.006 0.011 0.0099 0.0089
(0.0432) (0.0367) (0.0688) (0.0602) (0.0518)
ln(￿
2) (panel) -1.5874*** -0.5814***
(0.2882) (0.3014)
￿ (panel) 0.4522*** 0.7478***
(0.0652) (0.1127)
￿ (panel) 0.1697*** 0.1453***
(0.0406) (0.0374)
N 14040 14040 14040 14040 13975
Groups 216 216 216 216 215
Obs per Group 65 65 65 65 65
Wald ￿2(9) 26.2 38.5 25.1 25.1 27.1
Table A2: Determinants of swithing behavior. Notes: RE stands for random e⁄ects, PA
population averages, while FE is for ￿xed e⁄ects model. Standard errors in parentheses.
*/**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1 percent level. Standard errors are calculated
using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account potential presence
of clusters in treatments.
51reg1 reg2 reg3 reg4
sds;t 1.0036￿￿￿ 1.0026￿￿￿ 1.0026￿￿￿ 1.0007￿￿￿
(0.0081) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0070)
Gen. mod. (M6), ￿ = 0 0.0015￿￿ 0.0009 0.0015
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0010)
Sticky info. (M2) -0.0027￿￿ -0.0034￿￿ -0.0028￿￿ -0.0037￿￿￿
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0011)
ADE DGL (M4) -0.0023￿￿ -0.0028￿￿ -0.0023￿ -0.0024￿￿
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0011)
Trend Ext. (M5) 0.0036￿￿ 0.0031￿￿ 0.0037￿￿ 0.0034￿￿
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0013)
ADE CGL (M3) -0.0017 -0.0011
(0.0010) (0.0008)
Recursive V1 (M7) -0.0005 -0.0008
(0.0010) (0.0009)
Recursive V4 (M9) 0.0005
(0.0010)
T2 0.0446 0.0426 0.0426 0.0476
(0.0347) (0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0384)
T3 -0.0873 -0.0918 -0.0918 -0.0829
(0.0553) (0.0567) (0.0567) (0.0549)
T4 -0.1246￿ -0.1296￿ -0.1296￿ -0.1242￿
(0.0701) (0.0719) (0.0719) (0.0725)
cons 0.0221 0.0847 0.0323 0.0777￿
(0.0612) (0.0909) (0.0827) (0.0404)
N 1560 1560 1560 1560
￿2 74609.6 101746.4 101746.4 68326.8
Table A3: Decision model￿ s in￿ uence on standard deviation of in￿ ation. Notes: Esti-
mations are conducted using system GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) for
dynamic panels. Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance
at 10/5/1 percent level.
B (Not for Publication) Results on Individual Rules
B.1 Tests of Rational Expectations
Several econometric tests are designed to check the rationality of forecasts. In this sub-
section we apply some standard tests commonly employed in the survey data literature.36
We assess di⁄erent degrees of forecast e¢ ciency and check whether forecasts yield pre-
dictable errors. The simplest test of e¢ ciency is a test of bias:
￿t+1 ￿ ￿
k
t+1jt = ￿; (15)
36See Pesaran (1987), Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004) and Bakhshi and Yates (1998) for a review
of these methods.
52where ￿t+1 is in￿ ation at time t + 1 and ￿k
t+1jt is kth subject￿ s in￿ ation expectations for
time t+1 made at time t (with information set t￿1). By regressing expectational errors
on a constant we check whether in￿ ation expectations are centred around the right value.
Majority of agents produce unbiased estimates of in￿ ation. Overall, only 7:9% of them
produce biased estimates at a 5% signi￿cance level and only 4:6% at a 1% threshold.
Most of them are from treatments 2 and 4.
The next regression represents a further test for rationality:
￿t+1 = a + b￿
k
t+1jt: (16)
As in Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004) the last expression can be simply augmented to
test whether information in forecasts are fully exploited:
￿t+1 ￿ ￿
k
t+1jt = a + (b ￿ 1)￿
k
t+1jt; (17)
where rationality implies jointly that a = 0 and b = 1. As in the test for bias, under the
null of rationality these regressions are meant to have no predictive power. The latter
model is a more strict test of rationality and is seldomly ful￿lled in the survey data liter-
ature. On the contrary, our results suggest that 28:7% of agents exploit all the available
information at a 5% signi￿cance level and 42:1% of them when we decrease the threshold
to 1%. Treatment 2 is associated with the highest proportion of rational agents (48% and
57%, accordingly). Compared to other experimental studies, these tests suggest that a
signi￿cant proportion of subjects behave rationally, although in asset pricing experiments
Heemeijer, Hommes, Sonnemans, and Tuinstra (2009) ￿nd a signi￿cant proportion of fun-
damental traders. These can be associated with rational expectations. Also Roos and
Luhan (2008) show that about 23% of subjects do not have biased price expectations.37
B.2 Sticky Information Type Regression
In this section we estimate a simple weighted average regression similar in formulation
to sticky information model by Carroll (2003a) and adaptive expectations. In our frame-
work we have forecasts derived under the assumption of rational expectations while Car-











t+1jt = ￿1￿0 + ￿1￿1yt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿
k
tjt￿1; (19)
37In ￿eld experiments by Berlemann and Nelson (2005) similar rationality tests were conducted sug-
gesting that most participants exploit all available information.
53where ￿RE
t+1jt is a rational expectations prediction of in￿ ation for period t + 1 at period t.
This type of models are important for forecasting, especially in our framework where some
agents are backward-looking and also rational agents have to incorporate this into their
forecasts. Thus we estimate the model (19) that is stated in terms of observable variables
with the restrictions on all coe¢ cients, where ￿0 and ￿1 are REE coe¢ cients. Our formu-
lation is inherently di⁄erent than the one by Carroll (2003a, 2003b) as epidemiological
framework that he proposes is no longer valid in our setup where subjects in principle
observe all relevant information.38 About 97% of agents display a signi￿cantly positive
￿1, while the average ￿1 is 0:20. Groups in treatment 3 had the highest average ￿1 (0:37),
while subjects in treatment 2 had the lowest (0:11). It is not straightforward to de￿ne
rationality in our framework and thus the results can be challenged on these grounds.
The de￿nition used in this subsection corresponds to REE if all agents in the group form
expectations rationally.39 Similar weighted average regressions are estimated in Heemei-
jer, Hommes, Sonnemans, and Tuinstra (2009), where they replace RE prediction with
the equilibrium price.
B.3 Trend Extrapolation Rule
We also evaluate simple trend extrapolation rules. These are pointed out as particularly
important rules for expectation formation process in Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and
van de Velden (2005). We specify the following process:
￿
k
t+1jt ￿ ￿t￿1 = ￿0 + ￿1 (￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿2); (20)
where we estimate ￿0 and ￿1. We ￿nd that constant is signi￿cant at 5% level in 28:7% of
cases while the ￿1 is signi￿cant in 78:2% of cases at the same level. Most of the times ￿1
is between 0 and 1, but there are a few cases when ￿1 is signi￿cantly lower than 0 (6:9%)
and for 15:3% of subjects it is signi￿cantly higher than 1. We refer to the latter rules as
strong trend extrapolation. Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and van de Velden (2005)
￿nd that about 50% of subjects in their experiment behave consistently with the trend
extrapolation rule.
B.4 Estimating Simple Learning Rules
In order to test for adaptive behavior, we apply di⁄erent learning rules to experimental
data. For a discussion on learning rules and convergence to rational expectations see
Evans and Honkapohja (2001). We ￿rst test learning on a model with constant gain
38He argues that news about in￿ ation spreads slowly across agents and reaches only a fraction ￿1 of
population in each period.
39Note if we would use naive expectations this model would correspond to adaptive expectations in
equation (21).
54updating (CGL), where subjects learn from their past observed errors. The model below












where # is the constant gain parameter. Under this learning rule agents revise their
expectations according to the last observed error. In the experiment subjects are asked
to forecast in￿ ation in the next period (hence they make their forecast for period t + 1
at time t), therefore the revision regards their previous period￿ s forecast (t￿1), which is
made at time t￿2. Note that this rule corresponds to the second order adaptive scheme
in Marimon, Spear, and Sunder (1993). All participants have # positive and signi￿cant
at a 5 percent level. 13:4% of participants have a constant gain parameter signi￿cantly
lower than 1, while 53:7% of them update their forecasts with an error correction term
signi￿cantly greater than 1. This means that the latter agents possibly overreact to their
past errors. Their prevalence might imply problems with dynamic stability in certain
treatments.














If the estimated parameter (￿ in this version) is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0, we conclude
that agents actually learn from their past mistakes with a decreasing gain over time. Our
tests do not support the hypotheses that the coe¢ cient decreases over time as the R2 is
always greater (for all subjects) for a constant gain model.
Several versions of these models are estimated in Arifovic and Sargent (2003), Hommes,
Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and van de Velden (2005), Marimon and Sunder (1995) and Bernasconi
and Kirchkamp (2000). Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and van de Velden (2005) argue
that some subjects (about 5%) behave consistently with this rule, while Marimon and
Sunder (1995) and Bernasconi and Kirchkamp (2000) put forward that most subjects in
their OLG experiments use either ￿rst or second order adaptive expectations.
B.4.1 Recursive Representation of Simple Learning Rules
The above speci￿cation mainly aims at testing whether data support the existence of
adaptive behavior. As in the adaptive learning literature in this subsection we assume
that subjects behave like econometricians, using all available information at the time
of the forecast. In the following speci￿cations, we test whether agents update their
coe¢ cients with respect to the last observed error. We assume four di⁄erent perceived
55laws of motion (PLM):
￿
k
t+1jt = ￿0;t￿1 + ￿1;t￿1￿t￿1 + "t: (23)
￿
k
t+1jt = ￿0;t￿1 + ￿1;t￿1yt￿1 + "t: (24)
￿
k
t+1jt = ￿0;t￿1 + ￿1;t￿1￿
k
tjt￿1 + "t: (25)
￿
k
t+1jt ￿ ￿t￿1 = ￿0;t￿1 + ￿1;t￿1 (￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿2) + "t: (26)
Note that equation (24) represents a PLM of the REE form and equation (26) a
version of the trend extrapolation rule. When agents estimate their PLMs they exploit
all available information up to period t ￿ 1. As new data become available they update
their estimates according to a stochastic gradient learning (see Evans, Honkapohja, and
Williams, 2010) with a constant gain. Let Xt and b ￿t be the following vectors: Xt = ￿
1 ￿t
￿




. In this version of constant gain learning (CGL)
agents update coe¢ cients according to the following rule:




￿t ￿ Xt￿2b ￿t￿2
￿
: (27)
The empirical approach consists in searching the parameter # that minimizes the sum






(see Pfajfar and Santoro, 2010 for details).
The implicit problem in this approach is that we have to assume the initial values for b ￿t
for 2 periods. Setting up the initial values is one of the main problems when we recursively
estimate learning. This issue is extensively discussed in Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou
(2007). Strictly speaking, this problem should not occur in our case since we simply try
to replicate our time-series data as closely as possible. Thus, in the following recursive
learning estimations, we design an exercise in order to search for the best combinations
of the gain parameter and initial values to match each subjects￿expectations as closely
as possible. This strategy can also be considered as a testing procedure for the detection
of learning dynamics for each individual. If the gain is positive under this method of
initialization, then the series would exhibit learning for all other initialization methods
with higher (or equal) gain.
We ￿nd that 56:5% of participants learn according to the ￿rst setup with lagged
in￿ ation as in model (23). The gain parameter # is in the range between 0:0001 and
0:1000, with a mean value of 0:02900 and the median is 0:01125. We also estimate
adaptive learning with the PLMs consistent of the REE form and AR(1) form, however
these models rarely outperform other models studied here. In the learning version of the
trend extrapolation model (26) 31:5% of subjects have positive gains. The optimal gains
are on average slightly higher than before as they range between 0:0003 and 0:7900 with
a mean value of 0:0654 (the median is 0:0310).
This version of the PLM (26) often performs better than previous versions of learning
56in terms of SSE. Below we compare di⁄erent models and ￿nd that this version of con-
stant gain learning indeed best represents the behavior of a signi￿cant proportion of our
subjects. For a comparison with other studies, we exclude from our sample all subjects
for which learning does not represent the best model.40 In this case, we ￿nd that the
average gain of these subjects is 0:0447 with a standard deviation of 0:0537 (median is
0:0260). The standard deviation is quite high as there are a few very high values, but
most of the gains fall in the range between 0:01 and 0:07.
There are only a few estimates of the gain coe¢ cient in the literature. Orphanides
and Williams (2005a) suggest a gain between 0:01 ￿ 0:04 and Milani (2007) estimates
it at 0:0183, while Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) ￿nd smaller gains (around 0:00021 for a
similar version of learning). Results in this paper suggest slightly higher gains than most
of the above papers, but our data might be more volatile than the actual US in￿ ation.
B.5 "General" Models of Expectation Formation
Simple learning rules do not capture all macroeconomic factors that can a⁄ect in￿ ation
forecasts. In this subsection we estimate some general models of expectation formation.
We specify the following regression:41
￿
k
t+1jt = ￿ + ￿￿t￿1 + ￿yt￿1 + ￿it￿1 + ￿￿
k
tjt￿1 + "t: (28)
We ￿nd that 81:9% of agents take into account in￿ ation when making their predictions.
About 56:0% of the subjects take interest rate into account, while 66:7% also regard their
own forecast from the previous period. Under some restrictions this equation could
represent the form of the RE solution of the model (￿ = 0).42
For a comparison we also estimate a simple AR(1) model:
￿
k
t+1jt = ￿0 + ￿1￿
k
tjt￿1 + "t: (29)
Similar model was already estimated with recursive learning. Model with constant
coe¢ cients, in general, is not often used by subjects for forecasting in￿ ation.
40We will consider Comparison 1 in the Table 6 and exclude model (24) as it is generally associated
with extremely high values of gain parameter.
41Models in groups 19-24 do not have interest rate as dependent variable as this would imply multico-
linearity due to the design of monetary policy in our framework.
42We also investigate more in depth the nature of the forecast error. We estimate the model where we
regress the forecast error on past observed forecast error and changes of other macroeconomic variables.
Subjects often do not exploit the informational content of the output gap and most importantly subjects
overreact to last observed change of in￿ ation. As the coe¢ cient in front of the change in in￿ ation is in
most cases higher than 1, we can say many subject are pessimistic about future developments of in￿ ation.
This feature is repeatedly found in the survey data literature.
57C (Not for Publication) Experimental Instructions43
Thank you for participating in this experiment, a project of economic investigation. Your
earnings depend on your decisions and the decisions of the other participants. There is a
show up fee of the 4 Euros assured. From now on until the end of the experiment you are
not allowed to communicate with each other. If you have some question raise your hand
and one of the instructors will answer the question in private. Please do not ask aloud.
The Experiment
All participants receive exactly the same instructions. You and 8 other subjects all
participate as agents in the same ￿ctitious economy. You will have to predict future
values of given economic variables. The experiment consists of 70 periods. The rules are
the same in all the periods. You will interact with the same 8 subjects during the whole
experiment.
Imagine that you work in a ￿rm where you have to predict in￿ ation for the next
period. Your pro￿t depends on the accuracy of your in￿ ation expectation.
Information in Each Period
The economy will be described with 3 variables in this experiment: the in￿ ation rate, the
output gap, and the interest rate.
￿ In￿ ation measures general rise in prices in the economy. Each period it depends
on the in￿ ation expectations of the agents in economy (you and other 8 participants
in this experiment), output gap and small random shocks.
￿ The output gap measures for how much (in %) the actual Gross Domestic Product
di⁄ers from the potential one. If the output gap is greater than 0, it means that the
economy is producing more than the potential level, if negative, less than potential
level. It depends each period on in￿ ation expectations of the agents in economy,
past output gap, interest rate and small random shocks.
￿ The interest rate is (in this experiment) the price of borrowing the money (in %)
for one period. The interest rate is set by the monetary authority. Their decision
mostly depends on in￿ ation (expectations) of the agents in economy.
All given variables might be relevant for in￿ ation forecast, but it is up to you to work
out their relation and possible bene￿t of knowing them. The evolution of variables will
43Instructions used for experiments at Universitat Pompeu Fabra are in Spanish language. In experi-
mental sessions, they were accompanied with the screenshots of the experimental interface and the pro￿t
table with earnings for various combinations of estimation error and con￿dence interval.
58partly depend on the inputs of you and other subjects and also di⁄erent random shocks
in￿ uencing the economy.
￿ You enter the economy in period 1. In this period you will be given computer
generated past values of in￿ ation, output gap and interest rate for 10 periods back
(Called: -9, -8, ... -1, 0)
￿ In period 2 you will be given all past values as seen in period 1 plus the value from
period 1 (Periods: -9, -8, ... 0, 1).
￿ In period 3 you will see all past values as in period 2 (Periods: -9, -8, ... 1, 2) plus
YOUR prediction about in￿ ation in period 2 that you made in period 1.
￿ In period t you will see all past values of actual in￿ ation up to period (Periods: -9,
-8, ... , ) and your predictions up to period (Periods: 2, 3, ... , ).
What Do You Have to Decide?
Your payo⁄ will depend on the accuracy of your prediction of the in￿ ation in the future
period. In each period your prediction will consist of two parts:
1. Expected in￿ ation, (in %) that you expect to be in the NEXT period (Exp:Inf:)
2. The Con￿dence Interval (Conf:Int:) around your prediction for which you think
there is 95% probability that the actual in￿ ation will fall into. The interval is
determined as the number of percentage points for which the actual in￿ ation can
be higher or lower.
Example 1 Let￿ s say you think that in￿ation in the next period will be 3:7%. And you
also think there is most likely (95% probability) that the actual in￿ation will not di⁄er
from that value for more than 0:7 percentage points. Therefore, you expect that there is
95% probability that actual in￿ation in the next period will be between 3:0% and 4:4%
(3:7% ￿ 0:7%). Your inputs in the experiment will be 3:7 under 1) and 0:7 under 2).













where Exp:Inf. is your expectation about the in￿ ation in the NEXT period, Conf:Int.
is the con￿dence interval you have chosen, In￿ ation is the actual in￿ ation in the next pe-
riod, and x is a variable with value 1 if
Exp:Inf: ￿ Conf:Int: ￿ Inflation ￿ Exp:Inf: + Conf:Int:
59and 0 otherwise.
This expression tells you, that x will be 1, if actual in￿ ation falls between Exp:Inf:￿
Conf:Int: (3:0% in our example) and Exp:Inf: + Conf:Int: (4:4% in our example).
The ￿rst part of the payo⁄ function states that you will receive some payo⁄ if the
actual value in the next period will di⁄er from your prediction in this period for less than
4 percentage points. The smaller this di⁄erence will be, the higher the payo⁄you receive.
With a zero forecast error (jInflation ￿ Exp:Inf:j = 0), you would receive 80 units.
However, if your forecast is 1 percentage point higher or lower than the actual in￿ ation
rate, you will get only 30 units (100=2￿20). If your forecast error is 4 percentage points
or more, you will receive 0 units (100=5 ￿ 20).
The second part of the payo⁄ function simply states that you will get some extra
payo⁄ if the actual in￿ ation is within your expected interval and if that interval is not
be larger than ￿4 percentage point. The more certain of the actual value you are, the
smaller interval you give, and the higher will be your payo⁄ if the actual in￿ ation indeed
is in the given interval but there will also be higher chances that actual value will fall
outside your interval. In our example this interval is ￿0:7 percentage points. If the actual
in￿ ation falls in this interval you would receive 38:8 units (100=(1+0:7)￿20) in addition
to the payo⁄from the ￿rst part of the payo⁄function. If the actual values is outside your
interval, your receive 0.
In the attached sheet you can ￿nd table which shows various combinations of forecast
error and con￿dence interval needed to earn a given number of points. See also ￿gure on
the next page.
Information After Each Period
Your payo⁄ depends on your predictions for the next periods and actual realization in
next period. Because the actual in￿ ation will be only known in the next period, you will
also be informed about you current period (t) prediction and earnings after the end of
NEXT period ( t + 1). Therefore:
￿ After Period 1 you will not receive any earnings, since you did not make any pre-
diction for the period 1.
￿ In any other period, you will receive the information about the actual in￿ ation rate
in this period and your in￿ ation and con￿dence interval prediction from previous
period. You will also be informed if the actual in￿ ation value is in your expected
interval and what are your earnings for this period.
The units in the experiment are ￿ctitious. Your actual payo⁄will be the sum of pro￿ts
from all the periods converted to euros in 1=500 conversion.
If you have any questions please ask them now!
60Questionnaire44
1. If you believe that in￿ ation in the next period will be _ _4:2%_ _, and you are
quite sure that it will be higher than _ _ 3.5%_ _ and lower than _ _ 4.9%_ _,
you will type:
Under (1) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ for in￿ ation, and
Under (2) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ for con￿dence interval.
2. If you are now in period _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, you have information about past
in￿ ation, output gap and interest rate up to period _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ and
you have to predict the in￿ ation for period _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
44Options (1) and (2) are pointing to the di⁄erent ￿elds on the screenshot of the experimental interface.
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